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ABSTRACT 
I propose a rational reconstruction of the early quantum theory (1900–1913) in 
terms of the ideas presented by Ernst Cassirer. Specifically, I propose to 
reconsider the early quantum theory through the lens of the method of 
conceptual functionalization that Ernst Cassirer laid down in his Substance and 
Function (S&F, 1910) and he later refined in Determinism and Indeterminism in 
Modern Physics (D&I, 1937). Following Cassirer’s functional interpretation of 
natural sciences, it is my primary concern to reconsider the conceptual evolution 
of Planck’s quantum of action from 1900 to 1913. In this regard, I shall emphasize 
the importance of the quantum of action (Planck’s constant) in the architectonic 
structure of the early quantum theory, in the role of an element of fundamental 
continuity between the first quantum theory and the formulation by Niels Bohr 
of the first atomic theory. 
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§1. Introduction 
 HERE PROPOSE A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION of the early quantum theory (1900–1913) in 
terms of the ideas presented by Ernst Cassirer, in order to clarify some fundamental 
aspects of his epistemology and philosophy of physics. Specifically, I propose to reconsider the 
first quantum theory through the method of functionalization of concepts that Ernst Cassirer 
laid down in his Substance and Function (1910) (heretofore S&F), and through the 
epistemological interpretation of quantum physics that he gave in Determinism and 
Indeterminism in Modern Physics (1937) (heretofore D&I). 
To begin with, I would like to invite the reader to reflect on the concept of constant of 
nature, one of the less explored and less understood aspects of Cassirer’s philosophy of 
physics. As Cassirer declared: 
 
The historical development of modern physical theory throws a clear light on the progress from 
“individual constants” to “universal constants”, as one of the most important and fruitful factors in the 
whole process of scientific cognition (Cassirer 1957, 444). 
 
In the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer dealt with the case of 
modern spectroscopy, specifically the law that Johann Balmer had established in 1885 for the 
hydrogen spectrum.  
By reconsidering the history of spectroscopy, Cassirer noted that Balmer’s formula 
appeared as a special case of a universal law. In particular, the constant R (Rydberg’s constant) 
that appeared in Balmer’s series, at first it was considered as peculiar to the hydrogen, but it 
later became a universal constant. Cassirer was aware that the role and the relationships 
between Balmer’s law and the constant R (in the formulation given by Rydberg and Ritz) 
could be fully understood only in the framework of the quantum theory and linked to the 
universal magnitude h, that is, Planck’s quantum of action1.  
 
1  Planck introduced the notion of “elementary quantum of action” with the following words: “I want 
to designate this [i.e. the constant h] as the elementary quantum of action [elementares 
Wirkungsquantum] or as “element of action” [Wirkungselement], because it has the same 
dimension as the quantity which owes its name to the Principle of Least Action (Planck 1906, p. 
154). 
I	
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In D&I, Cassirer explicitly recognized that Planck’s constant represents a real ‘firm and 
secure point’ of modern physics, and all considerations over the quantum theory presuppose 
the universal validity of this magnitude: 
 
The elementary quantum of action constitutes, as it were, the fixed frame, into which all statements of 
quantum theory are fixed; and the security and firmness of this frame alone ought to be sufficient to 
protect the indeterminism of the theory against those speculative interpretations to which it was 
exposed in the transition from physics to general conclusions concerning man’s Weltanschauung 
(D&I, 121– 122). 
 
In this respect, the universal constants of nature appear as the starting point of Cassirer’s 
epistemological reflection on scientific knowledge. As a result, we should take the quantum of 
action as the starting point of the epistemological reflection on the quantum theory2. But, in 
Cassirer’s conception, the quantum of action cannot be regarded as an element of the “world 
of facts”, which would be accessible by immediate sensation; for Cassirer, Planck’s quantum is 
rather a part of the “world of physical objects” (Cassirer 1957, 21). The reason being that a 
constant of nature as a “physical object” can only be determined through a “highly complex 
intellectual process of interpretation” that constitutes the essence of a physical theory (ibid).  
It is my primary concern in the present paper to reconstruct the intellectual process 
underlying the interpretation of the elementary quantum in the early stages of its conceptual 
development. Starting from Cassirer’s understanding of Planck’s h, and in light of Cassirer’s 
functional view, I will lay emphasis on the principle of quantization in the role of principle of 
coordination of the quantum theory, as a conceptual function springing out from the original 
universal constant of the quantum of action. 
As is well known, Cassirer sought to modify the Kantian transcendental doctrine of pure 
intuition in response to the developments in mathematics and non–Euclidean geometry 
during the period ca. 1870–1920. In light of such transformations, Cassirer no longer held to 
the Kantian a priori pure forms of intuitions (space and time), but he recast them along the 
line of the neo–Kantian doctrine of the Marburg School3, for which space and time are 
concepts. In particular, Cassirer reconsidered the process of concept formation by purging 
intuitive or “visualizable” evidential content, and on that he went to elaborate a new abstract 
form of relation between the concept and its object: that is, the principle of coordination 
otherwise said as the relation of Zuordnung. Specifically, for Cassirer, the principle of 
coordination (or functional coordination) is a transcendental relation (in the revised version 
of Marburg neo–Kantianism) of abstract one–to–one correspondence or coordination 
between series, in conformity with the formulation of the modern concept of function. 
 
2  Cassirer clearly held that the ‘elementary action quantum’ is “the fundamental concept of the 
quantum theory” (Cassirer 1957, 474, ft. 85). 
3  In addition to Cassirer, other prominent representatives of the Marburg School were Hermann 
Cohen and Paul Natorp. In general, neo–Kantians downplayed the role of intuition in favor of 
concepts. 
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As far as the principle of quantization is concerned, Cassirer remained obscure on its 
definition, although the idea is widespread among specialists (Ryckman 2015) that the so–
called Planck–Einstein–de Broglie relation E = hν of proportionality between energy and 
frequency (where h is Planck’s constant) represents the “Archimedean point” of the quantum 
theory, to the extent that both Planck’s energy quanta and Einstein’s light quanta were 
associated by this same equation that Cassirer identified with the principle of coordination of 
the theory. 
Along the principle of quantization, I will then show that from the introduction of 
Planck’s h in 1900, there followed several stages of functionalization of concepts in the early 
development of quantum theory: Planck’s first radiation law (1900), Einstein’s method of 
discrete quantization (1906), Einstein’s theory of the specific heats of solids (1906), and the 
quantization of the hydrogen atom by Niels Bohr (1913). 
In so doing, the early quantum theory will be refashioned into a “functional structure” 
which Cassirer implicitly referred to in D&I, without carrying out, though, a proper analysis 
of the role that each statement of the results of measurements, statement of law, and statement 
of principle may play in a functional reconstruction of the early quantum, which, in my view, 
is necessary to understand D&I.  
For instance, Cassirer claimed: 
 
Totally different and apparently heterogeneous groups of phenomena are brought under the 
[quantum] principle: the theories of heat radiation —of the photo— electric effect and of specific heats 
—are brought together, and interpreted in a new manner by this principle (D&I, 110).  
 
In another passage, Cassirer observed: 
 
All particular certainties as they are given for instance in Planck’s law of radiation, in the Balmer’s 
series of the hydrogen spectrum, in the formula for the atomic heat, etc. always lead back to this 
general certainty [the quantum of action] (D&I, 121). 
 
First, it is my claim that a functional reconstruction of the early quantum theory in light of 
S&F may contribute to clarify the epistemological interpretation of quantum physics that 
Cassirer offered in D&I, with particular reference to the notion of the general principle of 
causality. Cassirer, indeed, regarded the general principle of causality as the most fundamental 
concept of his epistemological reflection. As it will be shown, Cassirer’s critical conception of 
causality can only be explained and understood in a functional perspective. 
Second, the present historical reconstruction of the quantum theory will provide an 
effective example of Cassirer’s genetic view of knowledge4, according to which a theory’s 
constructive presupposition (the concept) may neither be imposed on its “empirical basis” 
 
4  This epistemological approach characterized all the members of the Marburg School. 
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(the object) nor be derived from it. For Cassirer, the so–called “physical object” (in the process 
of advancement of scientific knowledge) can only be conceived as a “limiting concept” (S&F, 
228) that will never be conclusively determined. Following this conception, as Friedman 
(2000) pointed out, we will arrive at the conclusion that 
 
There is thus no ‘pre–conceptual’ manifold of sensations existing independently of pure thought at all. 
There is only an infinite methodological series in which the forms of pure thought are successively and 
asymptotically applied (p. 31)5. 
 
By adopting Cassirer’s functional–based approach, the early quantum theory shall be 
presented as constituted of a rational and progressive series of theories, with respect to which, 
the discovery of Planck’s constant and the first theory of radiation (1900), Einstein’s rule of 
quantization (1906), Einstein’s theory of the specific heats of solids (1906), the quantization of 
the hydrogen atom by Niels Bohr (1913) play the role of functional nodes at which the 
theory’s scientific propositions intersect along the axis of the above mentioned principle of 
quantization. 
Furthermore, a conceptual shift characterizes the transition from the earlier level of the 
theory onwards, that is —in Cassirer’s phrasing— from a statement of the results of 
measurements (Planck’s constant) to a statement of law (Planck’s radiation theory), and from 
this to statements of principle (i.e. Einstein’s rule of quantization, the theory of the specific 
heats of solids, and Bohr’s quantized atom), that is, the assumptions concerning the 
quantization of energy, radiation, material entities, and atomic structures which constitute the 
essence of the early quantum revolution. 
Unlike Thomas Kuhn, Cassirer’s functional–based approach upholds the claim that 
conceptual changes do take place in science in a rational and progressive way, in the sense that 
each new stage, which is connected to the preceding one, constitutes a new advancement 
towards the limiting physical concept, which will never be fully realized in experience. 
Before starting this historical detour, I will give an exposition of Cassirer’s functional 
approach in order to familiarize the reader with his epistemology and philosophy of physics. 
 
§2. Ernst Cassirer’s functional–based approach 
One important characteristic permeates the whole Cassirer’s philosophy of physics: the 
functional coordination among theory concepts (and among theories). According to Cassirer, 
functionality is the mutual coordination of one thing to another, and it is a necessary feature 
of the process of knowledge: if we consider the whole of experience, this whole —Cassirer 
stated— “is never a mere aggregate of perceptual data”, but it is divided and unified according 
to definite theoretical points of view” (S&F, 267). For Cassirer, such points of view correspond 
 
5  In fact, Cassirer’s epistemology is known as “logical idealism”. 
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to a presupposed order among the manifold of experience. Let’s see how to arrive at this 
order. 
In S&F Cassirer identified two fundamental moments in the process of induction which 
are worthy of consideration for the construction of scientific concepts: “the gaining of 
particular ‘facts’” (S&F, 265) and the connection of these facts into laws6. For any kind of 
assertion concerning facts, we need a presupposition, that is, a hypothesized relation among 
those basic facts. The question of functionality thus concerns the extent and the validity of 
these relations. 
With regard to the extent of the process of functionalization of concepts, in S&F Cassirer 
formulated the so–called method of super–ordination and subordination, which clearly 
explains the totality of empirical knowledge in terms of a function, which reproduces the 
characteristic relation according to which we conceive of the individual members as arranged 
in mutual dependence: 
 
Two fields of phenomena A and B are first united each according to a particular law ψ"(𝛼", 𝛼%, 𝛼&), 𝜓%(𝛽", 𝛽%, 𝛽&); these laws are again connected among themselves by a new relation ϕ(ψ", ψ%) until we 
finally reach the most general relation, which ascribes to each individual factor its definite place with 
regard to the others. The fundamental form F is analyzed for thought into a structure of mutually 
dependent determinations, which would be symbolically represented, for example, by an expression F [ 𝜙"(𝜓", 𝜓%), 𝜙%(𝜓&, 𝜓-), 𝜙& … ] (S&F, 267). 
 
The function F hence represents the totality of empirical knowledge at any point of time. This 
expression describes a system of elements (viz. phenomena), arranged in a “mutual relation of 
super–ordination and subordination” (ibid.), from which arises a “complex whole of 
overlapping synthesis” (ibid.). The problem concerning the quality or the condition of these 
relations introduces the second point of our discussion with regard to functionality: the 
validity of relations in the process of functionalization of concepts. The question at issue is: 
under what conditions a relation among concepts, along the process of subordination and 
super–ordination, may be (mathematically/empirically) defined. 
According to Cassirer, the validity of a connection is given by the conformity of this 
connection to law. This is an issue that links to the most fundamental concept of Cassirer’s 
epistemological reflection: the general principle of causality. 
 
6  Cassirer held that the processes of concepts formation in mathematics and physics have a common 
origin (which is identified with the “activity of constructing limit concepts”), although such 
processes are not identical (Mormann 2015, 35). This dual aspect of the concept formation has 
been remarkably described by Friedman (2000): “Cassirer’s Substance and Function, for example, 
retains an element of duality between pure thought and empirical reality, namely, the contrast 
between the pure relational structures of pure logic and mathematics, on the one side, and the 
historical sequence of successor theories representing the methodological progress of empirical 
natural science, on the other” (p. 76). 
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In Cassirer’s view, the general principle of causality does not refer to objects, but rather 
“to our cognition of objects in general” (D&I, 58). Cassirer conceived of causality neither as a 
subjective necessity nor as a constitutive a priori principle, but as a regulative a priori 
principle7. Causality is hence an ideal end for seeking a “never fully realizable complete system 
of knowledge of nature” (Friedman 2000). This teleological feature characterizes the concept 
of causality, which in this respect constitutes an overarching relation among conceptual 
objects such as measurements, laws, and principles (D&I, 60), as it refers to the way through 
which these statements should be combined with one another. Therefore, we are entitled to 
claim that the general principle of causality firstly is a method and a “postulate of empirical 
thought”: 
 
What the causal principle signifies —and this is the thesis I want to explain and establish in the 
sequel— is not a new insight concerning content, but solely one concerning method (D&I, 60). 
 
[…] With regard to content, it [the general causality principle] does not go beyond what has already 
been observed; it only confirms it and confers upon it as it were the epistemological imprimatur. In 
this sense it belongs, using the language of Kant, to the modal principles; it is a postulate of empirical 
thought (ibid). 
 
As is well known, the principle of causality over and over was subjected to different 
interpretations. In particular, the traditional principle of causality and the principle of 
continuity had been closely related from time to time. In classical physics, causality and 
continuity were so closely interwoven that it became difficult to distinguish them. 
Let me recall Kant’s two fundamental formulations of the principle of causality8. Both 
were spelled out in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781): one formulation can 
 
7  As is well known, Cassirer rejected the Kantian distinction between faculty of sensibility and faculty 
of understanding, as a consequence, the distinction between constitutive a priori principles (which 
arise from the application of the intellectual faculties of understanding and reason to the faculty of 
sensibility) and regulative a priori principles (which arise from the intellectual faculties themselves 
without such an application) is also untenable (see Friedman 2000). In conformity with the neo–
Kantian School of Marburg, Cassirer went to retain only the regulative principles, which remain 
indeterminate by definition. For this reason, causality, as a regulative principle, also remains 
indeterminate, because it cannot be fully realized in experience, but it is oriented towards the limit 
of an unrealizable complete system of knowledge (cf. Friedman 2000, 76). 
8  In S&F Cassirer placed emphasis on the twofold form of causality: the “scientific” and the 
“historical construction of concepts”: 
  «[Causality] signifies nothing else than the “necessity in the temporal sequence of the parts of 
reality”; we must postulate such a necessity also where we are concerned with the succession of 
purely individual events, which can thus never recur in precisely the same way. The specifically 
“historical causality” is founded on the application of this point of view» (S&F, 226 –227, ft. 85). 
Along with the historical conception, Cassirer exposed the “scientific conception” of causality as 
conformity to law: «Causality, which natural science affirms and makes the basis of its explanations, 
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be found in the Second Analogy of the “Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment”. 
This can be regarded as the general standard formulation of causality, and it refers to the 
conformity to law: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something 
upon which it follows according to a rule” (Kant 1781, A 189; from D&I, 162). 
The second formulation also is stated in the same edition of the Critique, precisely in the 
“Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, and it introduces two conditions: the 
first is the connection of causality with time; the second condition is continuity. 
Time is the fundamental condition for the “succession of the manifold” being described in 
terms of the cause–effect scheme. Further, the condition of time introduces the condition of 
continuity, which is essential to explain the “metaphysical” causal law that Cassirer rejected, 
and to better grasp the difference with his methodological use of causality as the general 
characteristic of order according to law. A critical theory of causality does not contain any 
references to the connections between “things” and “events” —Cassirer argues— but a 
statement about “the systematic interrelation of cognitions” (D&I, 163). 
By contrast, for Kant, an application of the category of understanding to appearances 
becomes possible by means of the transcendental time–determination (Kant 1781, A 139, 
272), which involves the principle of continuity. Cassirer, on his side, could not accept a time–
dependent concept of causality, having well in mind the latest developments in physics, such 
as the consequences of the formulation of Einstein’s theory of special relativity, which 
undermined space and time as a priori pure forms of sensuous intuition, and the discovery of 
Planck’s quantum of action, which undermined the assumption that all physical processes 
could be reduced to changes occurring continuously in time (Planck 1910, 239). 
In Cassirer’s view, one can hence give up a space–time representation while maintaining 
the concept of causality (Sundaram 1972; Ryckman 1991, 2015). 
In the wake of the nineteenth century program concerning the formulation of the modern 
concept of function, Cassirer purged the concept of cause of any visualizable content, 
expunging time and continuity from his “scientific conception” of causality. In so doing, the 
relation between concept and sensuously presented content (the phenomena, in Kant’s 
phrasing) was replaced by a new abstract relation between theory and experience (concept 
and its object), which aims to stress the consistency of a conceptual system, that is the relation 
of functional coordination or Zuordnung9. To say it with Thomas Ryckman’s words: 
 
[…] Once the relation of theory to sense experience was solely one of abstract correspondence or 
Zuordnung, methodological constraints or principles of theory choice gained new prominence, e.g., 
 
can be reduced to the idea of universal lawfulness. According to this view, to conceive an event 
causally means to subsume it under general laws» (ibid, 226). 
9  According to Ryckman (1991), the concept of Zuordnung can perhaps be attributed to Dirichlet 
(1837), who sought to specify the concept of “arbitrary function”. A special case of Zuordnung is ein–
eindeutig, a one–to–one coordination or correspondence. 
 
CASSIRER’S FUNCTIONAL–BASED APPROACH  |  8 
 
 
Disputatio (2018) 8: a012 
 
Eindeutigkeit, i.e., the “univocality” of the assignment of (the system of) symbols to (the system of) 
sense experience, “simplicity”, “unity”, and fewest “arbitrary elements” (Ryckman 1991, 60). 
 
This is a very important passage, for the reason that Zuordnung is the key concept for 
explaining the meaning and role of the general principle of causality in terms of conformity to 
rule. For Cassirer, the role of functional coordination (Zuordnung) is twofold: on the one 
hand, “it characterizes the “law” (Gesetz) of a series, connecting its individual members” 
(Ryckman 1991, 61). Cassirer identified this role with the rule of progression of a series when 
he analyzed the ordinary schema of the construction of concepts: 
 
The connection of the members of a series by the possession of a common “property” is only a special 
example of logically possible connections in general. The connection of the members is in every case 
produced by some general law of arrangement through which a thoroughgoing rule of succession is 
established. That which binds the elements of the series a, b, c, … together is not itself a new element, 
that was factually blended with them, but it is the rule of progression, which remains the same, no 
matter in which member it is represented (S&F, 17). 
 
On the other hand, functional coordination is “the relation of dependency or comparison 
between the members of distinct series, notably including the abstract and non–depictive 
relation of a system of concepts (or theory) to the manifold of sense perception” (Ryckman 
1991, 61). As Cassirer stated: 
 
Thus if we view the totality of empirical knowledge at any point of time, we can represent it in the 
form of a function, which reproduces the characteristic relation according to which we conceive 
the individual members arranged in mutual dependency (S&F, 267). 
 
In particular, the relation of functional coordination, in the role of “functional dependency”, 
does help us clarify the nexus between the question regarding the validity of relations in the 
process of functionalization of concepts and the neo–Kantian stance on the general principle 
of causality. By adopting the conception of causality as conformity to law, we will get that the 
validity of each logical connection at different levels of a series concept —along the process of 
super–ordination and subordination— is given by the conformity of these connections to the 
relation of dependency of such a series. The “limit result” will be the “asymptotical” 
combination of the valid logical connections within such a system, the system of physical 
knowledge. 
For instance, in the expression 𝐹 [Φ1 (𝜓1, 𝜓2), Φ2(𝜓3, 𝜓4), Φ3] , the symbols Φ1, Φ2, Φ3 
represent the logical connections at the higher level of the function F, while the symbols 𝜓1, 𝜓2 
and 𝜓3, 𝜓4 stand for the connections at a lower —less general— level of functional relations 
within the series. The “rule of progression” accounts for the relations among the members 
within Φ1, Φ2, etc., as well as among the members within 𝜓1, 𝜓2 and 𝜓3, 𝜓4, for which Φ1 and 
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Φ2 are respectively rules of progression; whilst the “relation of dependency” accounts for the 
relations among the members of Φ1 and Φ2 as well as among those of 𝜓1 and 𝜓3, 𝜓2 and 𝜓4. 
The resulting connections between the relation of dependency and the rules of 
progression can be regarded —by using a neo–Kantian phrasing— as “contextually a priori 
statements”, as far as each relation is necessary only at a certain level of the series concept, 
through their conformity to the principle of coordination (in the role of relation of 
dependency) of the series. 
Cassirer began to elaborate his functional–based approach to theory development since 
S&F, although, it was in D&I that he was able to complete his effort, highlighting the 
dynamical character of the process of theory development. Indeed, Cassirer in D&I clearly 
characterized the dynamical and holistic process of transformation of scientific concepts in 
terms of a “hierarchy of scientific propositions”: 
 
If we choose a spatial analogy for the structure of physics, we must not liken this structure to a pyramid 
resting on a broad base of immediately given and independent “facts”, rising gradually from this and 
ending in a highest point, perhaps in a simple “cosmic formula” […] Physics accordingly is to be 
compared not to a pyramid but insofar as we regard any spatial symbol as adequate and permissible, to 
the “well–rounded sphere” with which Parmenides described his “universe” (D&I, 35). 
 
As it is evident, physics is not a static system in which each level remains in isolation from one 
another, but a conceptual shift or translation characterizes this system of knowledge from 
“facts of science” (statements of results of measurements) to statements of laws, and from 
these to statements of principles. 
The point —Cassirer remarked— is to identify the logical process through which “the 
transition between the various types of physical statements take place” (D&I, 39) as well as 
“the rule by which thought may be guided from one law to the next” (D&I, 45). 
Cassirer pointed out that this process (of transition or “change of dimension”, D&I, 42) is 
a “new fundamental form of induction” that cannot be confused with the inductive process 
“from particulars to particulars” (D&I, 45). This new form of induction is but a 
“methodological demand”, for a thoroughgoing unity of the physical view of the universe” 
(D&I, 47), which underlies the formulation of any law and principle of nature. But it is the 
functional coordination among all the elements of physical knowledge that allows scientific 
statements to take part in the advancement of knowledge, ascribing to them a structural unity. 
Since there is a lower and a higher level in such a structure, these levels are nonetheless 
separated as from one another, provided that there is an essential interconnection among 
scientific concepts, which is guaranteed by the functional coordination of the series. As I see 
it, if we want to grasp the essence of the logic underlying the process of theory development 
prospected by Cassirer in D&I, we have to take up the procedure of functional coordination 
among theory concepts as it was originally laid down in S&F but that Cassirer omitted in 
D&I. 
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Several attempts have been proposed to endow Cassirer’s conceptual scheme with a 
geometrical representation, but even the one offered by Cassirer himself (the “well–rounded” 
Parmenidean sphere) does not seem to help us understand such a complex structure. For the 
sake of clarity, I here propose a new geometrical representation: 
 
 
Diagram 1. 
 
 
Statements of principles. 
 
(Different levels of generality). 
 
 
 
Statements of laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statements of results of Measurements. 
 
 
The vertical axis represents the “relation of dependency” among the levels of a series concept. 
The horizontal axes represent “the rules of progression” at each level of a series concept. The 
intersection between the “relation of dependency” and the “rules of progression” gives rise to 
(valid, that is, contextually necessary) logical connections at each level along the process of 
super–ordination and subordination of the series. The lower stage represents the “statements 
of results of measurements”. The statements of measurements are individual, as they all 
possess a definite point of space and time to which they are bound. They can also be 
designated as statements of the “first level”, as far as they constitute the basis of the system of 
knowledge: 
 
The statements of the results of measurements may indeed be designated as the alpha and omega of 
physics, its beginning and the end. From them all its judgments take their departure and to them they 
must all lead back again (D&I, 36). 
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Nevertheless, we cannot think of the basis of the system of physical knowledge as constituted 
of a mere aggregate of facts. This system is primarily based on “concrete determinations 
provided by the statements of the results of measurements” (ibid.). What gives objective 
validity and significance to a “physical object” is the very act of measurement, that is, the 
attribution of a precise numerical value to an object: 
 
Insofar as we determine in this way the pressure, volume, and temperature of a gas, the potential or 
kinetic energy of a system, the electric or magnetic field strength, we have in these determinations 
precisely what physics understands by its various objects (D&I, 36). 
 
Working upwards, statements of measurements turn into statements of laws (second stage of 
Diagram 1), which are general statements. It is worth noting that a conceptual shift from a 
lower to a higher level does not exhaust itself in the process of “expansion of the basis of 
knowledge” (D&I, 44), that is, in a mere generalization of a higher level with respect to a lower 
one, this process rather demands a “change of viewpoint”. Cassirer speaks of a change of 
dimension “that distinguishes the statements of laws from the mere statements of the results 
of measurements” (D&I, 42). As a matter of fact, any conceptual shift is characterized by a 
“jump” from a “type” of statements to another, that is, a certain type of statement can shift 
into the contiguous one by means of a “change of genus”, although this process goes on 
according to a “fundamental form of induction”, which is characterized by a tension towards 
the unity of the physical view of the universe. Cassirer pointed out that this conceptual shift is 
bidirectional, so that statements of laws may turn into principles, and the reversal is also 
possible. For this reason, a constant of nature is the starting point and ultimately given datum 
of epistemological reflection on scientific knowledge. 
What precisely is the difference between statements of measurements and statements of 
laws? 
Cassirer clearly identified the statements of laws with those statements which show the 
capacity to “characterize ‘matter’ by properties and relations invariant with regard to changes 
of particular positions in space and time” (D&I, 42), and he regarded them as statements of 
“higher order” (D&I, 35). 
Working upwards once more, statements of laws move to statements of principles (third 
stage of Diagram 1), that is, to fundamental laws of nature, which show the following 
methodological characteristics: i) they are universal; ii) they have a heuristic value: they are 
rules “for seeking and finding laws” (D&I, 52); iii) they do not refer directly to phenomena, 
but to the forms of the laws through which we order phenomena; iv) they have different 
grades of generality10. 
 
10  «Thus the difference between statements of principles, no matter how general, and the causal 
principle itself cannot be wiped out » (D&I, 57). In my view, Cassirer was arguing that statements of 
principle might lie on different levels, depending on their grades of generality in the process of 
development of scientific knowledge. 
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The principle of causality is on the whole a statement of principle, although its level of 
universality is so high that we can arrive at that only by means of a further “jump”. Cassirer 
defined the general principle of causality not as a statement about objects, but as a statement 
about our cognition of objects. More precisely, the general principle of causality constitutes 
the overall relational structure among measurements, laws and principles, by showing how all 
these statements should be related and combined with one another: that is, through the 
conformity of each statement to the principle of coordination of a theory. In this sense the 
scientific principle of causality represents the principle of coordination of the entire system of 
knowledge in its constant tension towards the construction of limit concepts. 
 
§3. The functional character of Planck’s first radiation law 
The first level of the series of functional relations with regard to the quantum theory was set in 
1900, when Planck succeeded in obtaining the law for the energy distribution of blackbody 
radiation by introducing a new constant of nature. This constant allowed establishing a 
relation between the energy of a resonator (a hypothetic device that Planck used to discuss the 
problem of equilibrium radiation in a blackbody) and the intensity of radiation for a given 
wavelength11. The episode is crucial as it offers a glimpse of the fundamental role played by a 
particular law in establishing a relation among phenomena: specifically, a relation for the 
distribution of energy among N resonators of frequency n. This fact reminds us of the very 
early stage of the procedure of super–ordination and subordination, in which, according to 
Cassirer “two fields of phenomena A and B are first united each according to a particular law” 
(S&F, 267). 
Moreover, the introduction of the quantum of action was carried out in the context of a 
background of knowledge (i.e. Boltzmann’s statistical method) that according to Cassirer’s 
terminology represents the “logical presupposition” which precedes any operation of 
enumeration and measurement. On 14 December 1900, Planck presented his new radiation 
law at the German Physical Society in Berlin. He started his speech by emphasizing the 
necessity of using Boltzmann’s probability arguments in the blackbody theory, and he soon 
after dealt with the distribution of a given amount of energy E among N cavity resonators 
with frequency ν. 
 
If E is considered as an infinitely divisible quantity, the distribution can be made in an infinite number 
of ways. However, we consider —and this is the most important point of the entire calculation— E as 
being composed of a completely definite number of finite, equal parts, and make use for that purpose 
of the natural constant h = 6.55 · 10–27 (Erg · Sec2). This constant, when multiplied by the common 
frequency ν of the resonators, yields the energy element ε in ergs; and by dividing E by ε we obtain P, 
the n umber of energy elements which have to be distributed among the N resonators. If the quotient 
 
11  Planck approached this domain of research also in consequence of the metrological importance of 
the radiation problem, which was a means to measure the temperature of a blast furnace. 
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(E/ε) thus calculated does not happen to be an integral number, then one has to take for P an integer 
close to it (the quotient) (Planck 1900, 239–240). 
 
Planck introduced the constant h in the framework of Boltzmann’s method, which was used 
to get the relation between entropy and probability. Boltzmann’s method hence constitutes 
the “logical presupposition” of the establishment of a new relation; that is, Planck’s condition 
for the oscillator, which in this “turn of events” formally became a “statement of law”, 
although this movement would be fully developed throughout an historical process which led 
to the formulation of the Einstein–de Broglie relation, that is, the principle of coordination of 
the theory12. 
I now want to return to the relationship between the formulation of Planck’s radiation law 
and Boltzmann’s method in order to clarify the reason for which Boltzmann’s method is the 
logical presupposition of Planck’s hypothesis of natural radiation. 
In the years between 1897 and 1899, Planck set forth his program for a theory of 
radiation. This program was in continuity with his early work in thermodynamics for the 
irreversible approach of radiation to equilibrium. Planck aimed to show that a conservative 
system consisting of electromagnetic radiation in a blackbody, interacting with a collection of 
harmonic oscillators, could approach an equilibrium state without the need of any 
assumption —unlike Boltzmann had done— beyond the laws of electromagnetism. 
Specifically, Planck’s idea was that electromagnetic radiation interacting with a system of 
electric resonators (oscillators) at every possible frequency should irreversibly evolve towards 
blackbody radiation. Nevertheless, as Boltzmann himself pointed out to Planck, the laws of 
electromagnetism did not determine the irreversible approach of radiation to equilibrium. 
Additional assumptions were needed: statistical assumptions about the disordered character 
of the initial state such as Boltzmann had made in the theory of gases. It was in this framework 
of ideas that Planck introduced the hypothesis of natural radiation h, according to which the 
partial vibrations of the radiation and the oscillator remained completely incoherent. The 
introduction of natural radiation made the large–scale evolution of the system an irreversible 
process. This procedure became known as Planck’s electromagnetic H–theorem, because in its 
demonstration Planck used functions of the oscillator and radiation energy that had the same 
form as Boltzmann’s H–function, that is 
 
S = K ln W.          (3.1) 
 
 
12  As is well known, light quanta have an energy given by the Planck–Einstein relation E = ℎn. Louis de 
Broglie, in his 1924–PhD dissertation, argued that if light–quanta show both wave–like and 
particle–like properties, electrons too show wave–like properties. By means of the Planck–Einstein 
relation, it turned out that the relationship between the wave length, λ, associated with an electron, 
and its momentum, p, through Planck’s constant, is: l = h/p. 
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(Where S is the entropy, K is Boltzmann’s constant, ln is the natural logarithm, and W is the 
probability density of the energy over a set of oscillators: the so–called complexion, a 
definition used also by Boltzmann in 1877). 
In this sense, Planck’s revolutionary work requires as a precondition Boltzmann’s 
method, with the difference that: for Planck, a “complexion” was given by a correspondence 
between an oscillator and the number of the energy–elements possessed by this oscillator. For 
Boltzmann, the correspondence was between a molecule and the discrete energy of this 
molecule. 
We have now arrived at the very crucial question regarding Planck’s revolutionary work 
of 1900, which essentially concerns the method that Planck used for deriving his distribution 
law. Planck made a fundamental departure from Boltzmann’s method (Klein 1962), which 
precisely consists in the variety of complexions considered in the calculation of W. On the one 
side, Planck took for his W the total number of complexions for all sets {wr} of resonators. On 
the other side, Boltzmann limited the choice concerning the complexion to the number of 
molecules carrying the energy. This inappropriate generalization of Boltzmann’s method was 
the way to obtain Planck’s distribution law (Darrigol 1991). 
Planck’s relation seems to suggest an undue generalization from Boltzmann’s method. 
The relation that here arises is a solution that Planck had to adopt or an ad hoc hypothesis that 
Planck would have formulated in whatever manner which had referred to Boltzmann’s 
expression in order to obtain the relation between entropy and probability. In my view, the 
introduction of Planck’s hypothesis recalls the procedure of the fundamental form of 
induction, which allows a conceptual system to develop on. As a matter of fact, Planck’s 
solution is a radical change of view that characterizes the advent of a new phase. The 
introduction of the quantum of action, a new constant of nature, is the starting point of a 
“chain” of relations inherent in the structure of a new theory (the quantum theory), and, with 
respect to our diagram, it would lie on the lower stage: as a “statement of results of 
measurements”. However, to say it with Cassirer’s words, an individual constant means 
nothing in itself, its meaning is established with respect to a background knowledge. 
Boltzmann’s method represents the necessary background within which Planck could 
introduce a new constant of nature, and from which a new chain of relations could start off. 
But the introduction of the quantum of action marked a radical departure from such a 
background, as far as there is a substantial difference between gas theory and radiation theory, 
and this difference rests on the “significance of the constant h”: 
 
It [constant h] marks an essential difference from the expression for the entropy of a gas. In the latter, 
the magnitude of an elementary region which we call dω disappears from the final result since its only 
effect is on the physically meaningless additive constant…The thermodynamics of radiation will 
therefore not be brought to an entirely satisfactory conclusion until the full and universal significance 
of the constant h is understood (Planck 1906, 153 f.). 
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This quotation links also to Planck’s later perception of his own discovery of 1900, Planck 
being certainly aware of having introduced a new way of calculating entropies that bridged 
two domains of physics: radiation theory and gas theory. Specifically, the constant K in the 
equation (3.1) had to be the same in both realms. However, in 1900–1901 Planck did not 
make any mention of the meaning of the constant h. Specifically, he did not say that the 
energy of a resonator could only be an integral multiple of hν, because in so doing, he would 
have introduced the concept of discontinuity in physics, as most historians and even scientists 
have incorrectly argued (Darrigol 2000). Planck himself defined the introduction of the new 
constant h as a “lucky intuition” or an “act of desperation”, and in that context (of discovery) 
he ascribed to it only a formal character, whose real meaning would be clarified later on. 
Returning to the present attempt to give a functional reconstruction of the early 
development of quantum theory, Planck’s radiation law here represents a rule of progression 
of the theory, as far as it constitutes a “common property” (S&F, 17) among the members of 
the series, by establishing a relation for the energy distribution among the frequencies in 
blackbody radiation. In this respect, this statement of law agreed with all the experimental 
data both at low frequencies and at high frequencies —where the “Rayleigh–Jeans” law 
failed— offering a unified description of all blackbody radiation over N resonators. 
Furthermore, I would not dispense with the fundamental fact that the introduction of the h 
contains in embryo all the stages of theory development prospected by Cassirer in D&I: i) at 
the very beginning, Planck regarded it as a mathematical device13; ii) Planck’s condition for 
the oscillator plays the role of a statement of law, i.e. Planck’s distribution law; iii) finally, the 
formal use that Planck made of the energy–elements, applicable only to the mechanism 
regulating the interaction between matter and radiation in the resonators, led to a 
fundamental conceptual development. As Cassirer pointed out: 
 
[…] What was originally the quantum law became the quantum principle. Its applications were no 
longer confined to individual branches of physics, however extended; it came to be understood and 
used rather as a general point of view, as a postulate of scientific knowledge (D&I, 110). 
 
If in 1900 Planck’s theory of radiation (the so–called quantum law) did not yet turn into 
principle, it already gave rise to the early stage of the principle of coordination (in the role of 
“relation of dependency”) of the quantum theory. I am referring to the well–known equation 
E = hn, which went to associate both the interaction between radiation and matter (Planck’s 
energy quanta) and the radiation in transit (Einstein’s light quanta) (cf. Jammer 1966, 36). As 
has been mentioned, the so–called Einstein–de Broglie equation was formally laid down in 
 
13  For Cassirer, the introduction of a constant of nature in a formula allows to establish a relation in 
the manifold of experience. Thanks to this new relation, the manifold of experience “gains that 
fixed and definite structure, that makes ‘nature’” (S&F, 230). The introduction of the h as a 
mathematical device is an aspect of the constitution of the so–called “physical object”, which status 
will be reached through the very act of measurement. 
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1900, although it was subjected to a conceptual development when it was associated with the 
concept of energy quantization in 1905–1906 (thanks to the independent contributions of 
Albert Einstein and Paul Ehrenfest) and with the particle–wave properties of the electron in 
1924 (thanks to de Broglie). For this reason, in view of the present reconstruction, the 
Einstein–de Broglie equation, as it was adumbrated in 1900, cannot be yet considered as a 
principle of scientific knowledge. 
The issue here at stake is the same one that Kuhn (1978) regarded as a fundamental aspect 
of the scientific revolution brought about by the introduction of quantum discontinuity: the 
assumption of the quantization of energy and radiation. But there is a difference between the 
present view and Kuhn’s account. 
For Kuhn, Einstein’s and Ehrenfest’s derivations of Planck’s radiation law amounted to a 
scientific revolution that led to the establishment of a new paradigm; the reason being that, 
according to this standpoint, Einstein and Ehrenfest introduced quantum discontinuity in the 
distribution of energy. 
According to the present view, Einstein’s endeavor of 1906 (I will not deal with 
Eherenfest’s contribution) is a generalization of higher level of Planck’s h along the relation of 
dependency E = hn, which was achieved through a fundamental form of induction, which is 
rational and progressive (see sections 2 and 4). 
In particular, the formulation of Einstein’s rule of quantization and the quantum–light 
hypothesis represent the transition of the h into a statement of principle. In the present 
functional perspective, this conceptual change did not determine a paradigm shift, but it 
rather constituted a conceptual extension demanding a “change of view” with respect to 
Planck’s theory of radiation: from the procedure of quantization, applied to material 
oscillators (Planck’s radiation theory) to the quantization of radiation. 
To conclude this section, I point out that Planck introduced the constant h and he 
associated finite energy–elements hn with harmonic oscillations at frequency n without 
changing his views on continuity and irreversibility with regard to electromagnetic radiation, 
but this happened in connection with a radical departure from the “logical presupposition” of 
the quantum theory, that is, Boltzmann’s statistical method. 
In view of Cassirer’s reading, I claim that if a revolution occurred, it happened on 
December 14, 1900, when Planck announced that he had found a new way of calculating 
entropies with respect to Boltzmann’s method. Therefore, our functional–based enquiry into 
the early quantum has now a starting point: the introduction of Planck’s h, which constitutes 
the very act through which the relation of functional coordination between a concept and its 
object first was posed in the context of the quantum theory. 
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§4. The conceptual functionalization of Einstein’s first derivation of Planck’s 
radiation law 
When in the mid–1906 Einstein derived Planck’s blackbody law, he brought into quantum 
theory a fundamental step along the relation of dependency of the theory. 
Both Einstein with his “Theory of the Emission and Absorption of Light” (1906b), and 
Ehrenfest with “On Planck’s Radiation Theory” (1906) were convinced that Planck’s law 
correctly described the equilibrium distribution of radiant energy, and time was hence ripe for 
a fundamental break with classical physics, because the basis on which Planck’s radiation 
theory lay were incompatible with those of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. 
Einstein, on his side, obtained Planck’s distribution law by supposing that the energy E of 
a resonator can assume only values that are integral multiples of hν. 
It should be mentioned that Einstein’s revolutionary step was already implicit in the so–
called heuristic principle laid down in the 1905–article on the “photoelectric effect”, in which 
Einstein introduced the concept of light–quantum14: 
 
If, in regard to the volume dependence of the entropy, monochromatic radiation (of sufficiently low 
density) behaves as a discrete medium consisting of energy quanta of magnitude Rβν/N, then this 
suggests an inquiry as to whether the laws of the generation and conversion of light are also 
constituted as if light were to consist of energy quanta of this kind (Einstein 1905, 143–144). 
 
Einstein’s hypothesis of light–quantum is an assertion on the significance of the quantum of 
action, which, through the heuristic principle, was extended to the very nature of the 
interaction between radiation and matter, that is, regarding not only the average energy of a 
material oscillator of frequency n. 
We should now enquire into the intellectual process underlying the conceptual 
development of the h, which led Einstein to formulate the concept of quantization of 
radiation. 
Let us consider that in 1905 Einstein introduced a quantization related to (the light–
quantum hypothesis) without using the –U relation, where U is the energy of Planck’s 
oscillator. The point is to show how Planck’s quantization is related to U and Einstein’s 
quantization is related to r. 
 
14  Einstein saw his derivation of Planck’s law as the confirmation of the existence of the light–quanta 
introduced in his theory on the photoelectric effect in 1905, although the author of the theory of 
special relativity had lots of hesitations in writing down the relation p = ℎ n/ c “side by side” with E 
= ℎ n. In fact, Einstein (1916) explicitly introduced photon momentum only when he was able to 
re–derive Planck’s radiation law (Pais 1982, 408–409). Moreover, in 1916 Robert Millikan gave 
experimental confirmation of the photoelectric equation, as a consequence Einstein’s light–
quantum hypothesis was endowed with physical significance. 
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According to Einstein (1906b), the connection between his own quantization for r and 
Planck’s quantization for U was possible by introducing a new assumption: “the energy E of a 
resonator cannot possess every arbitrary value, but only values which are integral multiples of 
ε, with ε = (R/N0) ⋅ βn [with β = h/k and R/N0 = k in terms of Planck’s constant]” (Einstein 
1906b, 202). 
When Einstein reexamined the derivation of Planck’s blackbody law in light of this new 
assumption, he concluded: 
 
We must consider the following theorem to be the basis of Planck’s radiation theory: the energy of a 
(Planck’s oscillator) can take on only those values that are integral multiples of hν (Einstein 1906b, 
202). 
 
According to the procedure of super–ordination and subordination, we might say that if 
Planck’s radiation law can be represented by the relation 𝜓1 (𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3) Einstein’s rule of 
quantization represents a new relation Φ (𝜓1, 𝜓2) that connects Planck’s law with other 
empirical laws. In view of the present reconstruction, I argue that Einstein’s discrete 
quantization (and the light–quantum hypothesis) represents a relation of super–ordination 
with respect to Planck’s radiation theory, along the Einstein–de Broglie relation of 
proportionality between energy and frequency. As a matter of fact, in 1905–1906, Einstein 
succeeded in extending the field of application of Planck’s hypothesis to radiation by shedding 
new light on the meaning of the quantum of action in terms of light–quanta, whereas Planck 
had shown his predilections for setting apart the problem of the radiation field. 
The formulation of Einstein’s method of discrete quantization is an example of a 
conceptual transition from an empirical law to a statement of principle, the reason being, not 
that a principle can be derived from a statement of law —in fact, Einstein’s method was not 
derived from Planck’s law, as Einstein gave independent reasoning with respect to Planck— 
but that Planck’s law was subjected to a conceptual extension, which required a “change of 
genus”: from the procedure of quantization applied to material oscillators (Planck’s radiation 
theory) to a new conception of radiation field (Einstein’s light–quantum and his method of 
quantization). As it is evident, Einstein’s solution demands a change of perspective that 
Planck himself, indeed, could not accept at that time, because it would have contradicted the 
foundations of classical electrodynamics. As Einstein pointed out: 
 
It is easy to see in what ways the foundations of Planck’s theory must be modified in order that the 
Planck’s radiation law becomes really a consequence of those theoretical foundations […]. A structure 
which may vibrate with the frequency n and which, because it possesses an electron charge, can 
convert radiation energy into energy of matter and vice versa, may not occupy vibration states with 
any arbitrary energy, but only those states with energies which are an integral multiple of hn (Einstein 
1909, 182). 
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Einstein showed that Planck’s law could be derived only if resonator energies were restricted 
to integral multiples of hn. This was a revolutionary fact that brought discontinuity into the 
tradition of physical sciences. What was a mere radiation law finally became a principle with a 
higher degree of generality. 
In a second instance, Einstein’s method has a heuristic value, as it points to rules “for 
seeking and finding laws” (D&I, 52): such as the explanation of the Doppler effect of canal 
rays by Johannes Stark, who in 1907 provided a new theoretical interpretation of the Doppler 
effect on the basis of Planck’s energy quantum (Stark 1907); the explanation of the properties 
of series and band spectra (Stark 1908), and the fluorescence of organic substances (Stark and 
Steubing 1908). 
As a statement of principle, Einstein’s method plays the role of a rule of progression 
among several empirical laws, which are connected by and can be derived from that: as it was 
for Planck’s radiation law, the Doppler’s effect of canal rays etc. This fact supports Cassirer’s 
claim that statements of laws may turn into principles, and the reversal is also possible. 
Finally, Einstein’s rule of quantization is a causal principle, as far as the validity of its 
functional connection is guaranteed by its conformity to the essence of the Einstein–de 
Broglie relation: the concept of quantization, which we can substantiate with Einstein’s claim 
that “the energy of a Planck’s oscillator can take on only those values that are integral 
multiples of hν” (Einstein 1906b). 
 
§5. The functional character of Einstein’s theory of the specific heats of solids 
A further level of functionalization of concepts, along the relation of dependency of the 
quantum theory (the Einstein–de Broglie relation), can be traced back to December 1906, 
when Einstein published the article “Planck’s Radiation Theory and the Theory of the Specific 
Heats of Solids” (1906a). 
The problem of the specific heats inaugurated a new chapter in the long history of 
quantum physics, although, since the appearance of Einstein’s pioneering work, it took four 
years before it went to displace the blackbody problem as one of the main concerns for 
quantum physicists. 
We can reasonably argue that even Einstein’s theory of the specific heats of solids is a 
further generalization of Planck’s radiation law, as far as Einstein’s rule of quantization was 
extended to the quantization of material entities. Yet the theory did not gain immediately 
unanimous consensus within the physicists’ community, for two main reasons: i) only few 
specialists were inclined to follow the intuitions of a young and almost unknown scientist, ii) 
only few physicists were involved in problems concerning the quantum theory. 
To summarize the situation regarding the problem of the specific heats prior to Einstein’s 
paper, the classical kinetic theory perfectly accounted for the value given by the Dulong–Petit 
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rule15 (1819). But it should be noted that almost all the measurements, aiming at verifying 
such a rule, were carried out at room temperature (3000 K) or above, “since analogous 
experiments at lower temperature would have posed insurmountable technical difficulties” 
(Jammer 1966, 46). Einstein knew of these difficulties and he was aware of the 
“contradictions” arising from the theory of specific heats, especially if viewed in light of the 
modern electron theory of matter16. In commenting on Planck’s results that the mechanism of 
energy transfer admits only of energy values that are integral multiples of hν, Einstein 
declared: 
 
I believe we should not content ourselves with this result […]. If Planck’s theory of radiation goes 
to the heart of the matter, then we must also expect to find contradictions between the present [i.e. 
classical] kinetic theory and experiment in other areas of the theory of heat —contradictions that can 
be resolved by following this new path. In my opinion, this expectation is actually realized (Einstein 
1906a, 184). 
 
In particular, Einstein went to apply Planck’s radiation law, which gave to any object 
oscillating in space with the frequency n at temperature T the mean energy 
 𝐸3 = 3 678 9:;<=	?@AB CDE ,         (5.1) 
 
From which he determined the specific heat per mole 
 𝑐 = 5.94∑ (L:M/OP)QRSA/TBURSAM/TBV"WQX .         (5.2) 
 
where β = h/k, a formula which shows that Cv decreases with T but is equal to the Dulong–
Petit rule at sufficiently high temperature. Equation (5.2) provided an explanation for the 
observed deviations of the atomic heats from the Dulong–Petit rule as well as their 
temperature dependence. As Einstein pointed out: 
 
If T/βν > 0.9, the contribution of the [oscillating constituent] to the molecular [atomic] specific heat 
does not deviate appreciably from the value 5.94, which also follows from the hitherto accepted 
 
15  The Dulong–Petit rule states that the product of the atomic molecular weight and the specific heat 
is a constant for all solids (approximately 6 cal/mole). 
16  As a matter of fact, the oscillating electron, which caused the dispersion of light, gave rise to extra 
degree of freedom. Therefore, a specific heat even larger than one foreseen by the Dulong–Petit 
rule had to be expected for monoatomic solids. 
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molecular–kinetic theory of heat. The smaller ν is, the lower will be the temperature for which this case 
is already achieved. If, however, T/βν < 0.1, then the [oscillating] object under consideration does not 
contribute appreciably to the specific heat. In between [these two cases] the expression (5.2) increases 
[with increasing temperature], first rapidly, then more slowly (Einstein 1906a, 186–187). 
 
Some considerations now impose upon us if we seek to view Einstein’s achievement in light of 
Cassirer’s functional perspective. 
First, Einstein’s work on specific heats is a further extension of Planck’s results along the 
relation of proportionality between energy and frequency, in the sense that Einstein succeeded 
in showing that Planck’s ideas could be applied beyond the domain of radiation problem. 
Second, Einstein’s endeavor represents a relation of super–ordination with respect to both 
Planck’s theory of radiation and the method of discrete quantization. The reason being that 
Einstein’s contribution to the specific heats of solids does represent a statement of principle, 
but with a difference with respect to the method of discrete quantization from 1906: the 
former was provided with a higher level of generality with respect to the latter and with a new 
meaning, because it made it possible the application of quantum conceptions to the molecular 
kinetic theory, endowing Planck’s ideas on natural radiation with “physical significance” 
(Jammer 1966, 45). In Cassirer’s view, it is worth noting that a “change of genus” is needed 
that allows a further extension of the concept of quantization to molecular kinetic theory, 
which is guided by the “methodological demand” (D&I, 47) of a unified explanation of 
physical phenomena. 
Third, the transition from Einstein’s discrete quantization into the theory of the specific 
heats put forward a new heuristic, as far as from 1907 considerations on radioactive 
phenomena became secondary with respect to considerations on atomic vibrations. As a 
matter of fact, Einstein’s paper on specific heats paved the road for a new line of research. In 
this connection, it should be noted that Einstein’s extension of Planck’s results plays the role 
of a new rule of progression, which is a new “common property” (S&F, 17) among other 
empirical laws. For example, in 1911 Walther Nernst wrote a paper in collaboration with 
Frederick Lindemann, entitled “Specific heat and quantum theory”, in which they stated: 
 
In a recently published investigation one of us [Nernst] has given a representation of quantum theory 
which, following Einstein, considers radiative phenomena as only secondary circumstances 
(‘begleitende Umstände’) and takes as its immediate point of departure the atomic vibrations (Nernst–
Lindemann 1911, from Jammer 1966, 48; Italics by the present author). 
 
That is to say that Nernst, following Einstein’s conception on the specific heats, inaugurated a 
trend of studies, which aimed to approach quantum theory from the molecular kinetic theory.  
Fifth, I point out that Einstein’s theory of the specific heats of solids conforms to the 
relation of proportionality between energy and frequency. As Einstein claimed, also the 
behavior of “oscillating objects” could be explained by assuming that the radiation consists of 
quanta: 
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From the foregoing [results] it is not enough to assume that oscillator energy with the frequency ν can 
only be emitted and absorbed in quanta of this size [i.e. hν], that one is only concerned with a property 
of emitting and absorbing matter. The [above] considerations … show that also the fluctuations in the 
spatial distribution of radiation and of radiation pressure behave as if radiation consisted of quanta of 
the size indicated (Einstein 1909, 191; Italics by the present author). 
 
By applying Cassirer’s reading, we can conclude this section by claiming that Einstein’s theory 
of the specific heats is a causal principle, as it conforms to the Einstein–de Broglie relation. 
 
§6. Niels Bohr and the quantization of the hydrogen atom 
Cassirer argued that the two fundamental assumptions (stationary states17 and frequency 
rule18) upon which Bohr’s theory of the hydrogen atom is based, were derived by 
presupposing the quantum postulate (D&I, 133), which in the present notation represents the 
principle of coordination in the role of relation of dependency of the quantum theory: the 
Einstein–de Broglie relation. 
In this section, I will be demonstrating that even Bohr’s endeavor represents a step along 
the process of functionalization of concepts that started in 1900 with the formulation of the 
concept of natural radiation. Cassirer, on his side, placed emphasis on the relations between 
Bohr’s atomic theory and Einstein’s frequency condition, which is straightforwardly 
connected to Planck’s conception of radiation, along the relation of proportionality between 
energy and frequency, as it has been shown in section 4. 
 
Bohr’s theory replaces the picture of the atom as a thing–like entity perceived by our senses, by the 
characteristic frequency condition, according to which the change in energy of an atomic system is related 
to the frequency of a light wave by a definite equation, h𝜈 = 𝐸1 – 𝐸2. Its success in calculating the energy 
levels of the hydrogen atom, so that this condition led to the hydrogen spectrum in exact accordance with 
Balmer’s formula, provided empirical proof for the fruitfulness of the theory (D&I, 133–134). 
 
By 1910s a few specialists had already started to use the quantum of action for the purpose of 
discrete selection among the possible states of the classical models of atoms, as they had 
realized that some kind of discontinuity had to be used for explaining the behavior of 
microphysical entities. Among them: Arthur Erich Haas, William Nicholson, Niels Bjerrum, 
and Niels Bohr. 
In particular, Bohr was the only among them who accepted the challenge to carry on a 
theory notwithstanding the violation of a direct relation between mechanical and optical 
frequencies. 
 
17  Any of several energy states an atom may occupy without emitting electromagnetic radiation. 
18  Einstein’s method of quantization or discrete selection of mechanical states. 
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If the assumption of the frequency rule (as it was called in the Bohr atom) was not new, 
the one concerning the stationary states was not unexpected either, as Johannes Stark had 
already discussed this hypothesis in his work on atomic dynamics from 1911 (which Bohr had 
read), and the possibility of their existence was also prospected in Nicholson’s papers. In this 
regard, I point out that the application by Bohr of the frequency rule assumption to 
Rutherford’s nuclear planetary model of the atom constitutes a conceptual shift, a change of 
perspective, which does not mean a conceptual rupture. Most fundamentally, it represents a 
further functional connection along the relation of proportionality between energy and 
frequency. In fact, in analogy with the quantization of Planck’s harmonic oscillator, Bohr 
assumed that the single electron of the hydrogen atom could exist only in a series of stationary 
states, determined by the “quantum rule”: 
 𝐸Z = −𝛼𝑛ℎ?̅?Z,            (6.1) 
 
where En is the binding energy of the electron, ?̅?Z the orbital frequency, h is Planck’s constant, 
α a numerical constant, n a positive integer. Eq. (6.1) is hence a generalization of Planck’s 
theory of radiation, which states that the emission and absorption of the energy concerns only 
certain states of the harmonic oscillator, whose energy for each of these states is: 
 𝐸Z = 𝑛ℎ𝜔.          (6.2) 
 
Since Eq. (6.2) cannot describe an atomic model involving a particle motion, the 
generalization of Planck’s theory of radiation is required for the frequency of the oscillator, ω, 
be replaced by the orbital frequency ?̅?Z. As a further step, in order to obtain Balmer–
Rydberg’s formula, Bohr had to assume Einstein’s frequency condition, h𝜈 = 𝐸1 – 𝐸2, which 
allowed to calculate the frequency of the emitted radiation when an electron passes from a 
stationary state to another. 
In spite of the violation of the causal nexus between the motion of the electron and the 
emitted radiation (which represents the very “change of view” in this respect), I point out that 
even the first atomic theory represents a valid logical connection along the process of super–
ordination and subordination, as also Bohr’s theory conforms to the Einstein–de Broglie 
relation of proportionality between energy and frequency. In fact, Bohr succeeded in 
incorporating in his hydrogenoid system previous “levels of connection” of the quantum 
theory: he started from the analogy with Planck’s oscillator, then he proceeded to apply 
Einstein’s frequency condition. In a functional perspective, Bohr’s work constitutes the most 
advanced statement of principle along the “relation of dependency” of the first quantum 
theory. Retrospectively, Bohr seemed to recognize it, when he admitted that his work was the 
rational development of Planck’s condition for the oscillator, whose generalization led to the 
formulation of the two fundamental assumptions (stationary states and frequency rule). In a 
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lecture before the German Physical Society in Berlin, Bohr explicitly claimed that Planck’s 
condition for the oscillator was the starting point from which he had managed to obtain “in a 
purely formal manner” a spectral theory, “the essential elements of which may be considered 
as a simultaneous rational development of the two ways of interpreting Planck’s result” (Bohr 
1920, 22; NBCW 3, 244). 
Further, Bohr’s first atomic theory lies on a position of super–ordination with respect to 
both Einstein’s contributions (discrete quantization and specific heats) and Planck’s theory of 
radiation, to the extent that the first theory of the hydrogen atom is an extension of Einstein’s 
and Planck’s conceptions on quantization of energy, radiation, and material entities 
(molecular kinetic theory) to a new domain: the quantization of atomic structures. Bohr’s 
work on the hydrogen atom is a new rule of progression of the quantum theory, as it 
represented the “common property” (S&F, 17) among empirical laws in the realm of atomic 
physics. 
For instance: Balmer’s equation, Rydberg’s constant, and Ritz’ combination principle 
were derived from Bohr’s theory and they could be connected by that. Moreover, it rendered 
possible the construction of the periodic system of elements by setting the number of 
electrons in the atom equal to the atomic number. Finally, Bohr’s quantized model of the 
atom contains in embryo a heuristic power, which would be developed by the correspondence 
principle19, which was formulated by Bohr in 1917 to extend the quantum theory by 
calculating, in the limit of large quantum numbers, the intensities of the spectral lines by 
means of the amplitudes of the harmonic components of the electron’s classical orbit. 
 
§7. Concluding remarks 
As I showed, causality and functionality are interdependent concepts in Cassirer’s 
epistemological reflection. In S&F Cassirer stressed two fundamental issues in the process of 
functionalization of concepts: the extent and the validity of functional relations. It should be 
also noted that in Cassirer’s system of scientific knowledge the new abstract relation of 
coordination between the concept and the object replaced the traditional conception of 
causality, which was related to time and continuity. That is, Cassirer explained the question of 
the validity of a functional connection within a conceptual system in terms of conformity to 
law, in which the conception of causality was purged of any visualizable content. 
 
19  In order to determine the energy of the stationary states, Bohr had to introduce a “quantum rule”: 
the energy of the nth stationary state is n⋅h/2 times the orbital frequency of the electron in this 
state. Assuming that the orbit of the electron is circular, this assumption is equivalent with the 
assumption that the angular momentum of the electron round the nucleus is equal to an entire 
multiple of h / 2𝜋 (Darrigol1992). 
In particular, by setting the frequency of the emitted radiation equal to half the final orbital 
frequency, Bohr renounced the classical relation between motion and emitted radiation, although 
he still required an analogous relation to subsist at the quantum level. This requirement is the 
conceptual embryo of what Bohr would later call the correspondence principle. 
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Cassirer’s conception of critical causality aims at providing the system of scientific 
knowledge with a “conceptual structure”, which is not an independent metaphysical reality, 
but it is a regulative idea, which is directed towards the construction of limit concepts, which 
will never be fully realized in experience. 
We are now arrived at the core issue of Cassirer’s genetic conception of knowledge, which 
takes the historical development of scientific knowledge as its ultimate given datum 
(Friedman 2016). On my side, I focused on the concept of constant of nature for shedding 
new light on Cassirer’s epistemological reflection on the early quantum theory. In particular, I 
sought to explain the relationships between Balmer’s law and Rydberg’s constant, and how 
these are related to Planck’s constant, by applying Cassirer’s functional view to the early 
development of the quantum theory. For this purpose, I identified Planck’s elementary 
quantum with the starting point of the early quantum theory. In a second instance, I 
integrated Cassirer’s functional view from S&F with the dynamic view that he laid down in 
D&I. On that I showed that a conceptual shift characterized the transition from the earlier 
level of the quantum theory onwards, that is: from a statement of the results of measurements 
(Planck’s constant) to a statement of law (Planck’s radiation theory), and from this to 
statements of principle (i.e. Einstein’s rule of quantization, the theory of the specific heats of 
solids, and Bohr’s quantized atom), that is, the assumptions concerning the quantization of 
energy, radiation, material entities, and atomic structures which constitute a conceptual series 
of progressive stages along the advancement of knowledge, oriented towards the construction 
of limit concepts. As I showed, the quantum of action’s conceptual structure already contains 
in embryo all the stages of its development (mathematical device, statement of law, statement 
of principle). And each stage of its successive conceptual development is also comprised of the 
preceding ones. As I see it, this aspect of theory development fits nicely the “well– rounded 
Parmenidean sphere” to which, for Cassirer, physics is to be compared. 
To conclude, I think I have demonstrated the existence of a straightforward logical 
connection among the following scientific relations: the introduction of the quantum 
hypothesis that Cassirer identified as a firm and stable frame of the quantum theory, Planck’s 
first theory of radiation, Einstein’s light–quantum hypothesis and the formulation of the 
discrete quantization, the theory of the specific heats of solids, and the formulation by Bohr of 
the first atomic theory, along the so–called principle of coordination —in the role of relation 
of dependency of the quantum theory— that Cassirer identified with the quantum postulate. 
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